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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1950s, American law has recognized a property right in a
person's publicity as "the right of each person to control and profit from
the publicity values which he has created."' The idea was initially
attractive; protecting a right of publicity would prevent a person from
using another's name, image, or attributes without permission, thereby
encouraging creativity. This right of publicity gave tangible value to
people's efforts in creating their status by making them the sole agents of
their promotion.2 A tort resulted whenever the name, identity, or
performance of a person was appropriated without authorization. 3 From
these modest beginnings, the right of publicity expanded as the need arose
to protect different manifestations of publicity promotion. 4 However, as
evidenced by the Ninth Circuit's decision in White v. Samsung Electronics
America, Inc.,5 the courts have widened the scope of the right of publicity
to the point where serious efforts must be made to limit the encroachment
of this personal property right upon First Amendment rights of free
expression. 6
Part II of this Note will discuss the evolution of the right of publicity
and Part Ill will analyze the impact of the White opinion. Part IV will
compare the treatment of First Amendment defenses in right of publicity
cases with the treatment of such defenses in copyright cases. Analysis of
the right of publicity is quite similar to that of copyright. Traditionally, the
* Winner of the 1994 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition at The Ohio State
University College of Law, sponsored by The American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers.
I Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTE P. PROBS. 203,
216 (1954).
2 See id. at 204, 216-19.
3 Common torts in this area include fraudulent endorsements and commercial
exploitation by posters, memorabilia, and the like.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 40-58 for a discussion of the most crucial
developments in the right of publicity's continuing evolution.
5 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
6 "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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courts have construed the right of publicity as an analogue to copyright and
patent protection, 7 particularly in terms of the interests a state seeks to
protect. Part V examines how best to limit the right of publicity's impact
on First Amendment rights, as well as the analogous situation in copyright
law. Finally, this Note proposes the integration of copyright's
idea/expression doctrine and fair use test into the right of publicity
analysis. This author believes this integration to be a workable solution
that both respects a person's right of publicity and ensures First
Amendment freedoms.
II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICrY: THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP
A. Evolution of the Right of Publicity Out of the Right to Privacy
The evolution of the right of publicity began in the articulation of a
right to privacy which was defined as a "right to be let alone." 8 This right
centered on the disclosure of private facts; one waived protection once
personal facts were made public.9 In particular, because this right centered
on abridgment of the "right to be let alone," a celebrity of the era waived
her right once she became the focus of media coverage. This waiver also
served as a defense in privacy litigation. 10 In the words of Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis: "[tihere are [those] who, in varying
7 "[T]he State's interest [in establishing a right of publicity] is closely analogous
to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap
the reward of his endeavors .... " Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
8 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193 (1890). In the context of analyzing the progressive protection of a
person's rights by legal codification, these authors reached the conclusion that existing
libel and slander laws provided insufficient protection for personal privacy. See id. at
197-98, 213-19. The authors of this early work concentrated on the harm possible
when one's privacy is invaded via disclosure of private matters. See id. at 214, 216-
20. For a critique of their work, see William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV.
383, 383-84, 389 (1960), and contrast with Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law:
Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966)
(criticizing the development of a right of privacy).
9 "The right to privacy ceases upon the publication of the facts by the individual,
or with his consent." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 218.
10 See id. at 214-15, 218.
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degrees, have renounced the right to live their lives screened from public
observation." 1'
In early nineteenth century America, poised as it was on the verge of
the motion picture and television industries, celebrity status was not a
particularly marketable commodity. 12 Therefore, a legal theory centering
on personal dignity was a reasonable response to the concerns of the day.
Later, when the economic value of celebrity status increased exponentially,
those seeking to maximize the exploitation of their stardom needed a new
theory to supply protection. Such a theory needed to be centered on the
economic value of one's personality, especially in light of the above waiver
defense of public disclosure. 13
In response to evolving publicity needs, Melville Nimmer observed
that the right of privacy "is not adequate to meet the demands of the
second half of the twentieth century," 14 as it would provide little protection
to popular figures in the burgeoning entertainment industry. 15 Nimmer
argued for the creation of a separate property theory. To this end, he
articulated the tenets of the right of publicity as the "right of each person
to control and profit from the publicity values which he has created or
11 Id. at 215. American tort law accepted the innovation of a right to privacy, and
ultimately commentators delineated four torts in the area: "[i]ntrusion upon the
plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs[;] [p]ublie disclosure of
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff[;] [p]ublicity which places the plaintiff in
a false light in the public eye[;] [a]ppropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the
plaintiff's name or likeness." Prosser, supra note 8, at 389; see also W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5TH ED. 1984).
12 See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 203-04.
13 As Melville Nimmer observed: "[w]ith the tremendous strides in
communications, advertising, and entertainment techniques, the public personality has
found that the use of his name, photograph, and likeness has taken on a pecuniary
value undreamed of at the turn of the century." 1d. at 204. For detailed histories of the
right of publicity, see generally Lee Goldman, Elvis is Alive, But He Shouldn't Be:
The Right of Publicity Revisited, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 597 (arguing for the
abolishment of the right of publicity) and Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity:
Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV.
1199, 1200-15 (1986).
14 Nimmer, supra note 1, at 203.
15 Responding to the impact of the waiver defense, Nimmer employed the logic
of the right of privacy and suggested that by entering the public eye, a person may
waive her privacy in regard to professional life, but she does not automatically waive
her right of privacy in her private life. Id. at 204-05. Nimmer further argued that
even if modified, the waiver defense posed too great an obstacle to the genuine
protection of property rights and turned to the articulation of the right of publicity. Id.
at 206.
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purchased." 16 Placing great faith in the courts to develop definite limits to
this right, Nimmer suggested that, at a minimum, there should be a First
Amendment "newsworthiness" exception, where the personal right of
publicity would give way to the greater public interest of information
dissemination. 17 As originally formulated, the right of publicity was a
narrow right-granted to fill the interstices of the right of privacy-and
was subordinate to First Amendment guarantees of free press and free
speech.
B. Courtroom Efforts: Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc.
Just prior to Nimmer's formative piece, the Second Circuit made the
first foray into enforcing a common law right of publicity. In Haelan
Laboratories,18 the court enjoined an unauthorized use of players' pictures
on baseball cards. The court portrayed the right of publicity as an
extension of the right of privacy, designed to protect one's economic
interests in public exposure. 19 Based on the players' right of publicity-a
right separate from, and in addition to, their right to privacy-the court
acknowledged that "a man has a right in the publicity value-of his
photograph," 20 and it held that equitable relief was justified when this
property right was infringed. Firmly connecting its decision to the
16 Id. at 216. Scholars' writings on the right of publicity acknowledge that
Nimmer's article provides the foundation for the right of publicity. See Theodore F.
Haas, Storehouse of Starlight: The First Amendment Privilege to Use Names and
Likenesses in Commercial Advertising, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 539, 543 n.18 (1986).
17 See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 216-17.
18 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). In this case, the plaintiff was a contracting party with
baseball players for the exclusive right to use their pictures on bubble gum cards.
Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 867. Allegedly, Topps "with knowledge of plaintiff's
exclusive rights," used pictures of the contracting players on its cards, without the
consent of the players. Id. at 868 (quoting plaintiff's complaint). The defendant
contended that "a man has no legal interest in the publication of his picture other than
his right of privacy," the idea being that since the players were public figures, they
had waived their privacy rights. Id.
19 "[Flat from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their
likenesses, [persons] would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for
authorizing advertisements ... ." Id. at 868.
20 Id. The court went to some length to differentiate the "right of publicity" from
the dignitary aspects of the "right of privacy," and thus focused on the economic
advantages derived from public exposure. Id.
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economic realities of the case, the court observed that "[t]his right of
publicity would usually yield [persons] no money unless it could be made
the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other advertiser from
using their pictures." 21
C. The Supreme Court Position
A few jurisdictions followed the Second Circuit's lead in Haelan
Laboratories and adopted a similar articulation of the right of publicity, 22
but widespread judicial acceptance of a right of publicity did not come until
the Supreme Court's decision in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co.23 In Zacchini, petitioner performed a "human cannonball" act at an
Ohio county fair, carrying on an act "invented by his father
and ... performed only by his family for the last fifty years." 24 Zacchini's
performances lasted about fifteen seconds each, during which "he [was]
shot from a cannon into a net some 200 feet away."25 Zacchini specifically
objected to any taping of his performance, yet an area television station
aired a tape of Zacchini's flight as part of its coverage of the county fair.26
After the broadcast, Zacchini claimed that the station's film clip constituted
"an 'unlawful appropriation of [his] professional property'" 27 and filed suit
seeking $25,000 in damages28 for "invasion of privacy, contending that the
defendant had appropriated the plaintiff's professional talents for its own
21 Id.
2 2 In the Third Circuit, the litigation of Sharman v. C. Schmidt & Sons, 216 F.
Supp. 401 (E.D. Pa. 1963), showed Pennsylvania's recognition of the right of
publicity: "[plublic figures in the celebrity category have a valuable property right in
their name and image." Id. at 407. In the Eighth Circuit, Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415
F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969), showed the court's acknowledgment of the right of
publicity, although it found no infringement. Id. at 1206-08. In Motschenbacher v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974), the Ninth Circuit cited
Haelan Labs. with approval, finding basis for a right of publicity. Id. at 825. Contra
Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323, 1326 (W.D. Tenn.
1977) ("The right of publicity is not a 'property right.'"), rev'd, 616 F.2d. 956 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
23 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
2 4 Id. at 563-64 (quoting appellant's brief).
25 Id. at 563.
26 Id. at 563-64.
2 7 Id. at 564 (quoting appellant's brief).
2 8 Id. at 575 n.12.
19941 1119
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
use." 29 Based on its finding of a "newsworthiness" exception for the press,
the Ohio Supreme Court found for the defendant: "[a] TV station has a
privilege to report in its newscasts matters of legitimate public interest
which would otherwise be protected by an individual's right of
publicity." 30 Specifically, the court defended the station's taped use of
Zacchini's entire flight by stating that the press "must be accorded broad
latitude in its choice of how much it presents of each story or incident." 31
The court did, however, acknowledge that the right of publicity attached to
Zacchini's act, and it would have been protected, save for the overriding
interests of the press. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
attention then focused on whether First Amendment "newsworthiness"
trumped petitioner's right of publicity. 32
The Supreme Court's pragmatic reasoning overruled the Ohio court's
determination and confirmed Zacchini's right of publicity. 33 Observing the
brief nature of Zacchini's act, the Court decided that broadcasting the
"entire performance ... goes to the heart of petitioner's ability to earn a
living as an entertainer"; 34 such broadcasting posed "a substantial threat to
the economic value of that performance."35 Further, "if the public can see
the act free on television, it will be less willing to pay to see it at the
29 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 456 (Ohio
1976) (syllabus of the court), rev'd, 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
3 0 Id. at 455 (syllabus of the court). The court's opinion went on to explain that a
television station abuses this privilege if it knowingly disseminates falsehoods or if its
actual intent was to "appropriate the benefit of the publicity for some non-privileged
private use." Id.
31 Id. at 461.
32 This is not to say that the First Amendment's relationship to the right of
publicity was the sole issue of concern on appeal. Prefatory to its analysis of the right
of publicity, the Court addressed concerns involving Supreme Court decisions on state
matters. Although rights of publicity are grounded in state law, the Ohio Supreme
Court's judgment "did not rest on an adequate and independent state ground, thereby
giving the Court jurisdiction to decide the federal issue presented in this case."
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 566. Essentially, the First Amendment defense was the avenue
of Court jurisdiction.
33 Nowhere in this opinion is the Court's pragmatic view more obvious than in its
characterization of the case's equities: "[i]ndeed, in the present case petitioner did not
seek to enjoin the broadcast of his act; he simply sought compensation for the
broadcast in the form of damages." Id. at 573-74. Court opinions in cases decided
upon the right of publicity appear especially likely to view the equities in this manner.
34 Id. at 576.
35 Id. at 575.
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fair." 36  The Court then balanced the public's interest in the
"newsworthiness" of Zacchini's flight against his right of publicity and
found that there was no justifiable elevation of the press's interests over
Zacchini's. 37 By airing Zacchini's entire performance, the Court held that
the newscast violated his right of publicity.38
D. Further Developments
In the years since Zacchini, the right of publicity has undergone several
refinements. Chief among these are a recognition of "sound alikes" as
breaches of the right of publicity and a determination of the right of
publicity's descendibility.
1. "Sound Alikes". Midler v. Ford Motor Co.
In Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,39 singer and actress Bette Midler sued
Ford for its breach of her right of publicity based on its use of a "sound
alike" to substitute for Midler's vocal performance in a commercial.
Initially, Ford's advertising agency tried to negotiate a contract with
Midler to sing in its commercial. 4 Thwarted by her adamant refusal, Ford
hired one of Midler's former backup singers; this singer was requested to
perform Midler's "Do You Want to Dance" and to "sound as much as
possible like the Bette Midler record." 41 The innovative aspect of this case
36 Id. In a footnote to this quotation, the Court addressed what effect a finding
that the broadcast had helped plaintiff's livelihood would have: "[i]n these
circumstances, petitioner would not be able to prove damages and thus would not
recover." Id. at 575 n.12.
37 "No social purpose is served by having the defendant get [for] free some
aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would normally
pay." Id. at 576 (quoting Kalven, supra note 8, at 331).
38 See id. at 574-76.
39 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). For a thorough analysis of Midler's place in the
right of publicity litigation history, see Terri E. Hilliard, Note, Advertisers Beware:
Bette Midler Doesn't Want to Dance, 9 Loy. L.A. ENT. LJ. 43 (1989), and Leonard
A. Wohl, Note, Federal Preemption of the Right of Publicity in Sing-Alike Cases, 1
FORDHAM ENT. MEDIA& INTELL. PRop. L.F. 47 (1990).
40 The commercial in question was part of Ford's "Yuppie Campaign"-"[t]he
aim was to make an emotional connection with Yuppies, bringing back memories of
when they were in college." Midler, 849 F.2d at 461. To this end, Ford wanted to use
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was the court's decision that purposeful mimicry of a person's voice was
an actionable tort in California based on the common law right of
publicity-not California's tortious appropriation statute.42 Citing the
controlling Supreme Court decision on the freedom of speech and press, 43
the court articulated the First Amendment's position in right of publicity
cases as validating the use of others' identities "[i]f the purpose is
'informative or cultural.'"44 If, however, the appropriation does not satisfy
this public good, then it is subject to restriction by the right of publicity.45
In the tradition of Zacchini, the court's logic was quite pragmatic and
emphasized that the defendant specifically sought to appropriate the
distinctive value of Midler's voice, given their solicitation of Midler's and
the "sound alike's" services. Further, the court described the human voice
as an inseparable part of identity and held that "[t]o impersonate her voice
is to pirate her identity." 46
2. Descendibility: Lugosi v. Universal Pictures
The issue in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures47 was whether publicity
rights are descendible, and therefore could be exploited and enforced by a
celebrity's descendants. 48 In Lugosi, heirs sought to enjoin defendants from
42 The law referenced here is section 3344 of the California Civil Code which
grants damages when one uses a "name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in
any manner" without consent or permission. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(a) (West Supp.
1994). This law is similarly construed in White and is discussed infra at note 63. See
also infra note 70.
43 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (holding that the false
reporting of a family's experience as hostages did not constitute libel without proof
that Life magazine printed the story with malice).
4 4 Midler, 849 F.2d at 462 (quoting Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin,
Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.I.
1577, 1596 (1979)).
45 See id.
46 Id. at 463.
47 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979). Other cases in this area include Estate of Presley v.
Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1355-61 (D.N.J. 1981) (holding that the right of publicity
is descendible and that the defendant's production, "The Big El Show," likely
infringed the right). Contra Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953, 957 (1980) (holding that the right of publicity
is not descendible in a case concerning pewter replicas of Elvis Presley).
48 A commentator has aptly called these cases, and those similar to them, "post
mortem 'star' wars, the ghoulish pursuit of profit from the persona of a deceased
celebrity." Halpern, supra note 13, at 1215.
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issuing merchandising licenses for the Count Dracula character as
portrayed by Bela Lugosi. 49 Relying on Prosser's analysis of privacy
rights,50 the court emphasized the personal nature of the right: "[t]he right
is not assignable... there is no common law right of action for a
publication concerning one who is already dead."51 In its decision, the
court emphasized the personal nature of the right of publicity, dependent as
it is on the efforts of its creator.5 2 Once Lugosi died, the court declared
that "his name was in the public domain ... [a]nyone.. . could use it for
a legitimate commercial purpose."5 3
Unfortunately, Lugosi is not the universal state of the law; other
jurisdictions have reached contrary decisions based on their state's
interpretation of right of publicity law.54 In Estate of Presley v. Russen,55
the court found the right of publicity to be inheritable because of its status
as a property right.56 In its decision, the court favorably cited to Chief
Judge Bird's dissent in Lugosi for the proposition that "[tihe financial
benefits of [the] labor [to create one's celebrity status] should go to the
celebrity's heirs." 57 Because the right of publicity arises out of common
law, the area is likely to remain uncertain until either Congress or the
Supreme Court acts.
4 9 Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 427. The defendant did not contest that it was indeed the
Lugosi version of Count Dracula that it sought to license, rather than that of any other
actor who had played Count Dracula. Id.
50 See Prosser, supra note 8.
51 Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 429 (quoting PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 814-15 (4th
ed. 1971) (emphasis added in opinion)); see also Halpern, supra note 13, at 1219-23.
52 Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 430.
53 Id.
54 A full discussion of this thorny aspect of the right of publicity is beyond the
scope of this paper; for a complete analysis see Halpern, supra note 13, at 1215-37.
55 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.NJ. 1981).
56 Id. at 1355.
57 Id. (quoting Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 446 (Bird, C.J., dissenting)).
1994] 1123
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
IH. WHITE V. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.:
ITS PLACE IN THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY DEBATE
A. The Majority Opinions
The plaintiff in this case,58 Vanna White-the well-known hostess of
television's "Wheel of Fortune" game show-sought to enforce her right of
publicity against the defendant for appropriation of her identity in its
advertising campaign. As part of a national campaign, Samsung published
a series of advertisements which attested to their products' longevity by
showing the products in a useful state well into the twenty-first century. 59
All of the advertisements were done in a humorous vein, suggesting
amusing future events, and the one of which White complained was no
exception. In this advertisement, a robot was shown on a stage "instantly
recognizable as the Wheel of Fortune game show set"; 60 the ad's caption
read, "Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D." 61 Further, and crucial to
the Ninth Circuit's decision, the robot was dressed to emulate White's
standard game show costume-evening gown and jewelry. 62 At the district
court level, the defendant won its summary judgment motion; the Ninth
Circuit reversed this ruling and held that White had a viable claim under
California's common law right of publicity. 63
58 White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992),
reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
59 White, 971 F.2d at 1396. The ads in this series humorously "hypothesizfed]
outrageous future outcomes." Id. Other ads in this series included a picture of raw
steak captioned "Revealed to be health food. 2010 A.D.," and a theoretical future
campaign poster depicting actor Morton Downey, Jr. with the legend "Presidential
candidate. 2008 A.D." Id.
6 0 Id.
61 Id.
62 "The gag here, I take it, was that Samsung would still be around when White
had been replaced by a robot." White, 989 F.2d at 1514 (Kozinski, I., dissenting).
The ad in question, shown alongside of Ms. White's picture, is attached to the
opinion. Id. at 1522-23.
63 Ms. White also appealed the dismissal of her case based on section 3344(a) of
the California Civil Code, where "[amny person who knowingly uses another's
name.., or likeness . . . for purposes of advertising or selling,... without such
person's prior consent . . . shall be liable for any damages." CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3344(a) (West Supp. 1994). The court affirmed dismissal of Ms. White's cause of
action under that provision, since "the robot at issue here was not White's 'likeness'
within the meaning of § 3344." White, 971 F.2d at 1397. Ms. White also appealed the
dismissal of her case based on trademark violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
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The major hurdle the Ninth Circuit had to overcome was the fact that
in no way could a robot be mistaken for Vanna White, therefore it was
more difficult to construe an appropriation of identity. Using Midler v.
Ford Motor Co.64 as a starting point, the court reasoned that "[t]he right of
publicity does not require that appropriations of identity be accomplished
through particular means to be actionable." 65 In explanation of its position,
the court observed that an appropriation was no less invasive when it
"avoided the most obvious means of appropriating the plaintiff['s]
identit[y]." 66 By recognizing publicity rights in more than names and
likenesses, the court argued that it was only acknowledging the previous
developments in Midler and stopping the "evisceration of the common law
right of publicity through means as facile as those in this case." 67
B. The Dissenting Opinions
Adamant dissents were filed in both the Ninth Circuit opinion and the
subsequent motion for rehearing en banc. Judge Alarcon's dissent in the
original case focused on the gap in the court's logic regarding its finding
that there was an appropriation of identity, even though the ad did not
portray a "likeness" of Vanna White.68 Judge Alarcon questioned the
majority's extension of California common law to include appropriations of
personality aspects other than names or likenesses. 69 Citing California's
tortious appropriation law as the legislative statement on the matter, his
dissent criticized the majority's new application of common law.70
§ 1125(a) (1988); the court found genuine issues of material fact here and remanded
for a decision. White, 971 F.2d at 1399-1401.
64 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
65 White, 971 F.2d at 1398. To illustrate how the instant facts constituted an
appropriation, the court hypothesized a commercial depicting a "robot with male
features, an African-American complexion, and a bald head... wearing black
hightop Air Jordan basketball sneakers, and a red basketball uniform with black
trim,... and the number 23." Id. at 1399. Even without lettering proclaiming
"Bulls" or "Jordan" on the jersey, the court argued, all of the elements taken together
with the filming of the robot making a slam dunk lead to the inescapable linking of the
ad with Michael Jordan. Id.
66 Id. at 1398.
67 1d. at 1399.
68 Id. at 1403 (Alarcon, I., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
69 Id.
70 The distinction between section 3344 of the California Civil Code and the
common law right of publicity was explained in Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal.
App. 3d 409 (1983): the statute requires cognizant appropriation, while ignorance is
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In the petition for rehearing, Judge Kozinski wrote in dissent to the
denial of the petition.7 1 The crux of Judge Kozinski's dissent was that
"[t]he panel's opinion is a classic case of overprotection." 72 By pulling
Ms. White's tort under the right of publicity's umbrella, he found that "it's
now a tort for advertisers to remind the public of a celebrity." 73 Much of
Judge Kozinski's dissent focused on the harm done to the First Amendment
by the court's decision. Judge Kozinski was quite willing to admit that the
First Amendment does not sanction the appropriation of "one particular
way of expressing an idea," 74 but it also should not permit one to
monopolize an idea to the point that any expression evoking that idea
constitutes an appropriation of property. 75 Judge Kozinski further argued
that part of the policy motivating the First Amendment protections is to
"protec[t] the free development of our national culture." 76 Out of this
policy, Judge Kozinski fashioned an argument that the First Amendment
provides shelter for parody and humor, thus protecting ads like Samsung's
over conflicting publicity rights. 77
Judge Kozinski's First Amendment discussion also dealt with the
majority's cursory treatment of Samsung's First Amendment defense. The
majority in White dismissed Samsung's First Amendment argument nearly
out of hand, based on the observation that this advertisement was "run for
the purpose of selling Samsung VCRs." 78 Under the majority's logic, there
was no First Amendment protection for commercial speech. This logic,
however, is not in accord with the Supreme Court's rulings.
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission,79 the Supreme Court articulated the test for the First
not a defense at common law; section 3344 remedies are specifically made cumulative
to other remedies. Id. at 417 n.6.
71 Judges O'Scannlain and Kleinfeld joined in his dissent. White v. Samsung
Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443
(1993).
72 Id. at 1514 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1519. Evidence that the First Amendment does not extend this far, Judge
Kozinski argued, is that the American legal system recognizes a structured form of
protection for trademarks, copyrights, and patents.
75 See id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1520.
78 White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir.
1992), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
79 447 U.S. 557 (1980). This case dealt with the constitutionality of defendant's
order banning advertising which promoted the use of electricity by electric companies.
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Amendment's protection of commercial speech. Under this test, a court
should first determine if the communication-the speech at issue-is
misleading or related to unlawful activity. If either is true, then the state
has the power to sharply curtail the communication.80 If, however, neither
is true, then the "[s]tate must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by
restrictions on commercial speech."81 Finally, any regulation must bear a
proportionate relationship to the state interest at hand.8 2 As a test of
proportionality, there is a mandate to use only the least restrictive means to
regulate commercial speech.83 Under Central Hudson's test, commercial
speech receives less protection than political commentary or religious
testimonials, but there is some protection for it.84
In its evaluation of Samsung's First Amendment rights, which the
defendant argued as its right to parody, the White majority did not employ
the Central Hudson test; it did not examine whether the restrictions were
justified by important state interests, nor was any mention made of least
restrictive means.8 5 In Judge Kozinski's words, the Court had formulated
the Central Hudson test "because it saw lower courts were giving the First
Amendment short shrift when confronted with commercial speech." 8 6 The
majority in White, despite the guidance of Central Hudson, failed to
respect the First Amendment.
Id. at 558-59. The Court held that such an action violated the First Amendment rights
of the utility company, based on the First Amendment's protection of commercial
speech. Id. at 570-72.
80 Id. at 564.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. The explanation of this test goes on to state that the determination of
proportionality may be done by examining whether the restriction advances the state
interest, and if such advancement could be "served as well by a more limited
restriction on commercial speech." Id.
84 Id. at 563.
85 The majority does mention Central Hudson, but only in a footnote to support
its assertion that commercial speech is given less protection under the First
Amendment. White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 n.3
(9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443
(1993).
86 White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1520 (9th Cir.)
(Kozinski, I., dissenting), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2442 (1993).
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IV. FIRST AMiNDMNT DEFENSES IN COPYRIGHT AND RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY LITIGATION
Protection of the right of publicity is very similar to the protection of
copyright.87 The goals are similar: both try to encourage an individual's
creative efforts with the assurance that their investments will be protected
in the form of limited monopolies. A primary difference between the two,
however, is that the statutory copyright system has made a sincere effort to
accommodate First Amendment concerns into its structure, whereas the
common law development of rights of publicity has not provided similar
safeguards.
A. Copyright Law's Treatment of First Amendment Concerns
Works have copyright protection if they are "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."88 Federal law
controls copyright protection to the exclusion of state law. The codification
of copyright gives protection for a limited time to an author who publishes
her work; after the copyright expires, the work falls into the public
domain, where all are free to use it.89 Insulation of First Amendment rights
in the federal scheme is accomplished primarily through two theories: the
idea/expression doctrine and the fair use doctrine.90 These two doctrines
are frequently the focus of attention in copyright litigation involving
parodies, where the courts struggle to reconcile First Amendment concerns
with an author's copyright. The Supreme Court ruling concerning the
87 Zacohini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, Co., 443 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
Here, the Court observed that the protection of a right of publicity "provides an
economic incentive for [the performer] to make the investment required to produce a
performance," and that "[t]his same consideration underlies the patent and copyright
laws long enforced by this Court." Id.
88 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). This basic definition of copyright demands that the
work be original, with minimal creativity (i.e., with some evidence of intellectual
labor, be the author's own, and be fixed (exist in tangible form)). The primary
purpose of the current version of copyright law-the 1976 version-was to kill off any
remaining vestige of common law copyright. SHELDON W. HALPERN ET AL.,
COPYRIGHT CASES AND MATERiALS 43-44 (1992).
89 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-305 (1988).
90 See infra parts IV.A.1-2.
1128 [Vol. 55:1115
WHITE v. SAMSUNG
specific treatment of parody under the First Amendment and copyright law
is of great importance here.91
1. The Idea/&pression Doctrine
The idea/expression doctrine is meant to limit the scope of copyright
and thereby the scope of monopolies; the law states that "[i]n no case does
copyright protection... extend to any idea,... principle, or
discovery." 92 Essentially, a copyright cannot exist on ideas, but only on
the expression of the idea; if the expression can only be conveyed in a few
ways, then the idea is said to have merged into its expression. 93 When such
merger occurs, a copyright of the work is unavailable because it would
take the idea out of the public domain; neither law nor public policy can
allow a monopoly on such an expression. 94
Courts have frequently cited to the idea/expression doctrine as a
primary guarantor of First Amendment rights. In Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp.,95 the Ninth Circuit relied on this
doctrine to support its finding of infringement, as the defendant had taken
more than the idea from the plaintiff, and had instead taken copyrightable
expression. In its analysis, the court succinctly summarized the protection
of the First Amendment by the idea/expression doctrine:
91 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991),
rev'd, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994) (9-0 decision).
92 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
93 Cases in this area include: Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir.
1991) (the publication of baseball game outcome predictions based on a number of
statistics is copyrightable only in response to nearly verbatim copying); Morrissey v.
Procter & Gamble, 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) (contest rules were not copyrightable
as there are only a few ways to state such rules); Matthew Bender & Co. v. Kluwer
Law Book Publishers, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (the data in personal
injury charts and its ordering is not protectable because of the limited ways to convey
such information).
94 When merger is found, courts are split over how to treat the works in issue.
One theory (the "infringement view") holds that the copyright stands on the material,
but it will only be enforced if there is verbatim copying. The Second Circuit and the
highly respected writings of Melville Nimmer endorse this view. A second theory (the
"copyright view") states that such merging expressions cannot get a copyright at all,
and are thus dedicated to the public domain from the start, no matter how much labor
was required in the work's production. HALPERN, supra note 88, at 84.
95 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff alleged that defendant's
"McDonaldland" characters infringed copyrights in plaintiff's "H.R. Pufnstuf"
characters).
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[Trhe idea-expression line represents an acceptable definitional
balance as between copyright and free speech interests. In some degree it
encroaches upon freedom of speech in that it abridges the right to
reproduce the "expression" of others, but this is justified by the greater
public good in the copyright encouragement of creative works. In some
degree it encroaches upon the author's right to control his work in that it
renders his "ideas" per se unprotectible, but this is justified by the greater
public need for free access to ideas as part of the democratic dialogue. 96
2. The Fair Use Doctrine
Typically, the fair use defense is the first defense employed in response
to copyright infringement charges; this defense is codified in the current
version of the copyright law. 97 Essentially, the defendant acknowledges his
taking of the author's work, but in defense claims that his use is sanctioned
by federal law, as his use is a productive activity, and thus is valuable to
society. It must be realized that the statutory enactment of the fair use test
does not give judges a bright line test; fair use is still explored on a case-
by-case basis. 98 An example of this analysis can be seen in Maxtone-
Graham v. Burtchaell,99 in which the Second Circuit employed the
copyright act's four part test to determine if a given use constituted a "fair
use."
The elements of this test are first, what the purpose and character of
the infringing use is-commercial, non-profit, or educational. Maxtone-
Graham indicates that a commercial use is presumptively unfair, but that
this presumption is rebuttable. 1' ° Second, the court must examine the
nature of the original work; a factual work would get less protection, as
less of it is copyrightable. 10 Third, the court must examine the amount
96 Id. at 1170 (quoting Melville Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1192-93
(1970)).
97 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). This section sets forth a four part test for fair use, 17
U.S.C. § 107(l)-(4). Prior to this statute, fair use was "exclusively judge-made
doctrine." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1170 (1994).
98 Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1170.
99 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987). In this
case, a priest copied from a series of interviews with women who had gone through
abortions and adoptions for use in his pamphlet decrying abortion's legality. The
defendant had asked permission to use the material, but it was denied. Id. at 1256-57.
100 Id. at 1260-62. As will be later discussed, the Supreme Court decision in
Acuff-Rose, accentuates this point when parody analysis is at issue. See infra text
accompanying notes 117-22.
101 See Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1262-63.
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and substantiality of copying. Here, the raw amount taken is not the issue,
but whether the "heart of the work" was taken. 102 Finally, the court needs
to determine what the effect on the potential market of the copyrighted
work will be, given the infringement. 10 3 The focus of this element is what
harm the original author has suffered.
Although each of the above four elements is to be evaluated separately,
all four are to be considered in the ultimate determination of the fair use
defense.104 In reality, however, the first and fourth elements-purpose of
use and effect on the market-have emerged as the most important portions
of the test; commercial gain for the infringer almost inevitably leads to a
presumption of harm to the original author and thereby to denial of the fair
use defense.105 While it is difficult for the commercial infringer to gain
protection here, it should be possible, depending on how the balancing of
the four elements plays out. The Supreme Court's holding in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. is extremely influential on this point, as the
overriding theme of the decision is that a commercial purpose will not, on
its own, prevent a finding of fair use. 106
The First Amendment's concern for the free exchange of ideas fits well
into the fair use analysis, as the infringer's purpose in appropriation is of
primary importance. It is for this reason that a court's First Amendment
analysis is often collapsed into fair use analysis, which places a great deal
of emphasis on any commercial elements found in the appropriation.10 7
Thus, the First Amendment analysis is often subsumed by fair use's
"purpose of the use" element, and often commercial speech does not
receive even Central Hudson's protection. 1 0 8
102 Id. at 1263.
103 Id. at 1263-64.
104 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1170-71 (1994).
105 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (5-4
decision). Universal alleged Sony to be a contributory infringer based on its sales of
Betamax VTRs. The Supreme Court found no infringement because there was a fair
use available to the consumers of the VTRs-namely the taping of programs for later
viewing. Id. at 417, 447-55.106 Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1173-79.
107 Courts are often reluctant to address consitituional issues directly. Legal
constructs like the fair use doctrine are therefore attractive, since using them allows
courts to avoid confronting the constitutional issue.
108 See supra text accompanying notes 80-86; see also Pamela Samuelson,
Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and
Copyright Cases, 57 TuL. L. REv. 836, 883-90 (1983).
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3. Recent Developments: Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
In Acuff-Rose, 1°9 the Supreme Court analyzed the state of parodies
within the copyright regime. Parody holds an interesting position in
copyright law.110 In litigation involving parodies, the defendant's theory is
that her use is a statutory fair use, but not entirely based on analogues to
Maxtone-Graham's four elements. Rather, the defendant argues that her
use is fair because of the four elements and because it is a parody."' The
majority position is that a protected parody can at least "conjure up" the
visage of the parodied work 1 2 by taking from the original work.
Protection extends beyond this threshold point to some level short of a total
appropriation. 113
In Acuff-Rose, the Sixth Circuit had ruled against the defendant's fair
use defense since the commercial use outweighed any findings in the
infringer's favor: "[ilt is the blatantly commercial purpose of the derivative
109 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991),
972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994). At issue was "2 Live
Crew's" rap version of Roy Orbison's classic "Oh, Pretty Woman." Acuff-Rose
owned the copyright in "Oh, Pretty Woman," and refused to license the "2 Live
Crew" version of the song. Acuff-Rose, 754 F. Supp. at 1152. "2 Live Crew"
recorded "Pretty Woman" anyway and released it in 1989. Id. As a result, Acuff-Rose
filed suit for infringement of its copyright. Id.
1 10 In copyright law, the definition of parody is the same as that used in common
parlance. A parody is a work which closely imitates another work for "comic effect or
in ridicule." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 851 (1988).
111 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1169 (1994).
1 12 There is a split of authority on this issue, primarily between the Second and
Ninth Circuits-the centers of copyright litigation. The Ninth Circuit previously held
that a parody was a permissible infringement so long as the parody did no more than
"conjure up" the essence of the original. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d
751, 757 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979). This court's current
position, which shows a gravitation toward the Second Circuit position, is that the
amount and substantiality of the taking are of primary importance, and that it is
acceptable for that amount to be some amount more than enough to "conjure up" the
memory of the original. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438-39 (9th Cir. 1986). The
Second Circuit's position on this issue provides more protection for parodies. See
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.)
(holding that Saturday Night Live's parody of Frank Sinatra's "I Love New York"
(into a skit "I Love Sodom") did not infringe), aft'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980); see
also HALPERN, supra note 88, at 508.
113 See Elsmere, 482 F. Supp. at 745-47.
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work that prevents this parody from being a fair use." 114 The Supreme
Court accepted review of Acuff-Rose on the sole question of whether a
commercial parody could ever constitute a fair use of the original work. 15
Writing for an unanimous court, Justice Souter first addressed the use
of the statutory fair use test as a whole, stressing that all four elements
were to be weighed together when analyzing fair use cases. 116 Examining
each element in turn, Justice Souter discussed the treatment of parodies
under the fair use test.
First, in regard to the nature of the use, 117 Justice Souter criticized the
Sixth Circuit's analysis that the work here was a commercial use.' 18 The
Court's argument here was based on the plain language of the statute,
which states that courts are to determine "the purpose and character of the
use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature."11 9 This
statement suggests that although a court may look at the commercial aspect
to determine the "purpose and character" of a use, there is more to the
analysis. This element is supposed to convey a sense of what the alleged
infringer actually did with the taken material. According to Justice Souter,
a preferred use under this element is one which goes beyond the original
and "adds something new, with a further purpose or different character,
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.... Such
works... lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing
space."120 Fitting parody into this analysis, Justice Souter stressed that
114 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 972 F.2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1992),
rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
115 Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1169.
116 Id. at 1169-71. Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence, and cautioned
that parodies cannot be given wider shelter under the fair use defense. Id. at 1181-82
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
117 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988).
118 In Justice Souter's words:
The Court of Appeals ... immediately cut short the enquiry into 2 Live Crew's
fair use claim by confining its treatment of the first factor essentially to one relevant
fact, the commercial nature of the use .... In giving virtually dispositive weight to the
commercial nature of the parody, the Court of Appeals erred.
Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1173-74.
119 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
120 Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1171.
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"parody has an obvious claim to transformative value." 121 When applying
the fair use test, this claim must be remembered as part of the nature of the
work. A parody should not receive special consideration, but will have to
pass the same fair use test as any other work. 122
Concerning the second element, "the nature of the copyrighted
work," 123 Justice Souter found its policy to be one of protection for certain
works "closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others." 124
Examples of such works are forthcoming publications' 25 and private
letters. 126 The point of this element is to make it harder to establish a fair
use when certain types of works have been used. In regard to parody,
Justice Souter observed that this element "is not much help . . . in
separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats in a parody
case." 127
Analyzing the third element, the amount taken, 128 the Court observed
that the nature of the work does much to determine what is an acceptable
amount.' 29 Applying this element requires a look at both the amount of
material taken and its quality, with the goal being to see if the work is a
slight repackaging of the original, or if it is a distinct development over the
original. The Court found that because parody requires a "recognizable
sight or sound," "[c]opying does not become excessive in relation to
parodic purpose merely because the portion taken was the original's
heart." 130 Based on this conclusion, Justice Souter again criticized the
121 Id. Earlier in this passage of his opinion, Justice Souter defined
"transformative value" in terms of those works which add to the original work's
expression. Id.
122 Id. at 1172.
123 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1988).
124 Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1175.
125 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
(holding that defendant infringed by taking quotations from an unpublished
manuscript).
126 See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding
infringement of plaintiff's copyright based on appropriation from unpublished letters,
despite the fact that the letters were given to university libraries).
127 Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1175. A parody usually targets an expressive work,
worthy of copyright protection. Thus, it is rare for this element to be of great concern
in fair use litigation.
128 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988).




narrow analysis of the Sixth Circuit, but remanded for evaluation on this
element.131
Turning to the fourth element, the market effect, 132 the Court noted a
lack of defendant's evidence on this point. The defendant provided only
"uncontroverted submissions that there was no likely effect on the market
for the original," 133 yet failed to address the effect of its work on
derivative works. This last element requires a defendant to show both
present harm, or lack thereof, and future effect. On this point, the Court
observed, "[t]he evidentiary hole will doubtless be plugged on remand." 134
In addition, the Court found fault with the Sixth Circuit decision, because
it presumed that the first element-"commercial use"-dictated a finding
against the defendant.135 This presumption was not an uncommon position
for courts to hold on this element, but Justice Souter left no doubt on this
point: "[n]o 'presumption' or inference of market harm ... is applicable to
a case involving something beyond mere duplication for commercial
purposes. "136
The Acuff-Rose decision is extremely important to the copyright world.
Although the four element test for fair use is still without bright lines,
Justice Souter's opinion does give courts some guidelines to emulate and
addresses some of the questionable court habits in applying the fair use
test. Further, this opinion, while not granting parody any special treatment
under the fair use law, ensures that parody cases will be on equal footing
with other cases under fair use analysis. 137 Justice Kennedy's concurrence
reinforces this position. 138 Giving parodies this opportunity for fair use
protection will foster fair use's integration of First Amendment concerns,
reiterating copyright law's balance between creativity and rights of
authorship.
131 Id. at 1176-77.
132 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988).
133 Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1177.
134 Id. at 1179.
135 Id. at 1177-79.
136 Id. at 1177.
137 Id. at 1171-73.
138 "As future courts apply our fair use analysis, they must take care to ensure
that not just any commercial take-off is rationalized post hoc as a parody." Id. at 1182
(Kennedy, L, concurring).
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B. The Right of Publicity's Treatment of First Amendment Concerns
Consistent with the above copyright cases, the First Amendment has
been given little attention in right of publicity analysis, but not because of
any self-imposed limitations like the idea/expression doctrine or fair use
exception. Rather, courts have fallen back on logic similar to Zacchini's:
the person is not seeking to withhold appropriation; she is merely seeking
to be compensated for its use.139 The other major block towards
recognizing a First Amendment defense in these cases has been the slight
protection granted commercial speech. As shown in White, the finding of
any amount of commercial motivation is virtually the kiss of death to a
First Amendment defense, even one based on an intent to parody the
original. 140 Even in the exalted field of news reporting, it is difficult to
conceive of a pure appropriation of publicity, untainted by commercial
avarice. 141 Still, as Midler indicates, the courts are willing to see this
"newsworthiness" as an exception to an individual's right of publicity. 142
Thus, the First Amendment provides only a limited amount of control over
the right of publicity and-given the breadth of the White opinion-a way
must be found to rein in the right of publicity. The following segment
proposes a solution to this problem.
139 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977).
"Petitioner does not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his performance; he simply wants
to be paid for it."
140 White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir.
1992) ("The difference between a 'parody' and a 'knock-off' is the difference between
fun and profit."), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2443 (1993).
141 Consider, for instance, network rating wars and the recent explosion of
tabloid journalism; what passes for news in the modem world is just as keyed to the
commercial market as Samsung's ad campaign.
142 "The purpose of the media's use of a person's identity is central. If the
purpose is 'informative or cultural' the use is immune; 'if it serves no such function
but merely exploits the individual portrayed, immunity will not be granted.'" Midler
v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Felcher & Rubin,
supra note 44, at 1596).
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V. OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO MODIFY THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. Arguments for the Complete Destruction of the Right of Publicity
One commentator argues a drastic position: the complete abolition of
the right of publicity. 143 However, the right of publicity serves a useful
function in today's law and should not be so lightly discarded. The right of
publicity has grown to fill a gap in the federal copyright scheme, providing
protection for those works which do not qualify for copyright protection
because they are unfixed. 144 Goldman, in recommending the end of this
right, sees copyright law and defamation suits as providing adequate
protection for publicity rights, thereby belittling the unjust enrichment and
personal autonomy rationales of the right of publicity. 145
As part of his argument that the right of publicity is useless in light of
existing law, however, Goldman suggests that the First Amendment
permits most exploitation of celebrity appropriation to go unchecked, even
that which is employed in the commercial context. 146 Unless courts start
applying the Central Hudson147 test for protected commercial speech to
cases like White, commercial speech will not be so protected; thus, the
right of publicity is of significant importance to the commercial speech
debate. In its role of providing protection to works outside of copyright or
trademark, the right of publicity serves an important role in our modem
legal system: it prevents unjust enrichment at the expense of the celebrity.
143 Goldman, supra note 13, at 625-28.
144 Fixation is a requirement for copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
It means that the author's work has assumed tangible form, and is able "to be
perceived." 17 U.S.C. § 101. An example of such work is the protection of Bette
Midler's voice in Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). Had the
defendant actually played a recording of the song, then copyright's statutory
protection would have been triggered. By using the sound alike, however, the
defendant nearly found a loophole, which was tied off by the right of publicity.
145 Goldman, supra note 13, at 605-07.
146 "Admittedly, a celebrity may feel frustrated if his name or likeness is used to
further sales of a product or service .... [However, most such uses of a celebrity's
identity would have an expressive element worthy of First Amendment protection."
Id. at 607.14 7 See supra text accompanying notes 79-84.
19941 1137
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
B. Reforming the Right of Publicity
If the right of publicity is to remain a useful part of the modem legal
system, it must be narrowed and modified. A primary area needing reform
is the right of publicity's interface with the First Amendment. To best
modify this area, courts would do well to bring the scope of the right of
publicity closer to that of its neighbor-copyright.
1. Engrafting Copyright's First Amendment Safeguards
onto the Right of Publicity
a. Integrating the Idea/Expression Doctrine into the Right of
Publicity Analysis
The right of publicity would benefit from the addition of an
idea/expression component. The effect of adopting the idea/expression
doctrine into the right of publicity analysis would be to allow protection of
a person's particular expression of an idea, but not the idea itself. Such a
limitation of the right of publicity would prevent the logical conclusion of
White's majority opinion, best articulated in Judge Alarcon's thoughtful
dissent:
The majority's position seems to allow any famous person or entity to
bring suit based on any commercial advertisement that depicts a character
or role performed by the plaintiff. Under the majority's view of the law,
Gene Autry could have brought an action for damages against all other
singing cowboys. Clint Eastwood would be able to sue anyone who plays
a tall, soft-spoken cowboy, unless, of course, Jimmy Stewart had not
previously enjoined Clint Eastwood. 148
If the idea/expression dichotomy had been used in White, finding for
the plaintiff would have been extremely difficult given the elements that the
148 White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1407 (9th Cir.
1992) (Alarcon, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993). Copyright law has dealt with a similar issue, holding that
characters themselves are not copyrightable-only the entire work is protectable.
Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding
that the "Greatest American Hero" did not infringe "Superman"); Detective Comics v.
Bruns Publications, 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding that defendant's
"Wonderman" was an infringement on "Superman").
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defendant mimicked; Ms. White can hardly have earned a monopoly on the
portrayal of a glamorous game show hostess.
b. Employing Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine in Right of Publicity
Analysis
Applying a fair use analysis to right of publicity cases would involve
the assimilation of Maxtone-Graham's four element interpretation of
copyright's fair use test. In a right of publicity case, the trier of fact would
first examine the nature of the use (i.e., whether it was commercial or non-
profit); second, determine the nature of the publicity right; third, assess the
amount taken from the original; fourth, calculate the appropriation's effect
on the market. 149 In analyzing right of publicity claims in this manner, a
court would have to be careful to acknowledge the Central Hudson
concerns regarding protected commercial speech. This acknowledgement
would be necessary because an appropriation not constituting a fair use of
the original would then deserve examination under the First
Amendment. 150 As per the Acuff-Rose decision, a finding of a commercial
use must not be allowed to dictate a finding against the defendant in right
of publicity cases. All four elements must be examined individually, even
if the defendant had used the original for commercial gain.
Had White been analyzed under a fair use defense, it is likely that the
decision would have still been for the plaintiff, because of the emphasis
courts have placed on the commercial elements of the Maxtone-Graham
test.151 It remains to be seen, however, if courts will continue this trend in
light of the Acuff-Rose decision. Under the first element-nature of use-a
court could not help but find for the plaintiff; advertising is indisputably a
commercial use. As Maxtone-Graham indicated, however, the commercial
use should not be fatal to the fair use claim, but merely should be
considered as a way to evaluate harm done to the plaintiff.152 Because of
the Acuff-Rose decision, a court could not consider this element to be
dispositive of the case; all four elements would have to be weighed.
In regard to the nature of the publicity right, the plaintiff's position in
White indicates that appearance was the publicity right in issue. On this
second element of the fair use test, the plaintiff would have been hard
pressed to argue that her manner of dress was a unique possession of
149 See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1260-64 (2d Cir. 1986)
and Samuelson, supra note 108, at 886; see also text accompanying notes 97-103.
150 See supra text accompanying notes 79-84.
151 See supra text accompanying notes 97-103.
15 2 Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1261-62.
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hers-glamorous dress being available to all who can afford it. 153 Judge
Kozinski's dissent addressed this point and observed that what truly evokes
Ms. White's image in the ad is not solely the robot's mimicry of her
appearance, but that "the robot is posed near the 'Wheel of Fortune' game
board." 154 In his view, it was the use of the set and not the robot's
appearance that called her right of publicity into question. Using this logic,
the nature of the right here is the appearance of the whole "Wheel of
Fortune" set. Since Ms. White is not the promoter of the entire set, her
right of publicity was not compromised. If the nature of the publicity right
in question had been so argued, the defendant might well have prevailed on
this element of the fair use test.
On the third element, all that the defendant took was a generic
appearance to which the plaintiff laid claim. As indicated in the analysis of
the second element-the nature of the publicity right in question-the
situation would be much different if Ms. White could enforce the rights of
the entire set. However, since the plaintiff is limited to enforcing only her
right of publicity, only the resemblance of the robot could have been
considered. In this narrow area, the only similarities were manner of dress,
hairstyle, and pose. 155 With only these similarities to consider, it is highly
likely that the defendant would have prevailed on this element of the fair
use test.
Finally, the effect on the market requires much more evidence than that
which was contained in the factual record. All that can be said for certain
is that Ms. White missed out on whatever Samsung might have paid her for
its appropriation of her identity. When all foregoing elements are weighed,
this defendant might well have established a fair use, but only if the court
avoided the conclusion that a commercial use was by definition fatal to a
fair use claim. The Acuff-Rose decision sends a cautionary message to
courts that have overemphasized the commercial aspect in fair use analysis.
It remains to be seen, however, how courts will integrate Acuff-Rose into
their fair use cases. 156
153 "[T]here must be ten million blond women (many of them quasi-famous) who
wear dresses and jewelry like White's." White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,
989 F.2d 1512, 1515 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2443 (1993).154 Id.
155 White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir.
1992), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
156 While the language of Acuff-Rose strongly urges courts to avoid focusing on
commercial aspects, these factors will be difficult for judges to ignore. Acuff-Rose
does not give trial judges any firm rules to apply in their analyses, and thus this author
fears that future judges will take care to avoid emphasizing the commercial elements,
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2. Encouraging a More Active Role for the First Amendment
in Both Copyright and Right of Publicity Defenses
Engrafting copyright's protections of First Amendment rights onto the
right of publicity would greatly improve the reasonableness of this property
right. What remains, however, is the low level of consideration that the
First Amendment receives as a defense in both copyright and right of
publicity litigation. The Supreme Court's decision in Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc. 157 does little to articulate the First Amendment's value in
this area. However, Acuff-Rose does establish that parodies can receive
copyright's fair use protections. As seen in Judge Kozinski's dissent to
White, parody serves an important public purpose analogous to the speech
which the First Amendment certainly protects-political discourse and the
like.158 The form parody takes is certainly different from that of protest
language, but "[p]arody, humor, [and] irreverence are all vital components
of the marketplace of ideas." 159 Acuff-Rose clarifies the position of parody
in the copyright realm and shows that First Amendment concerns can be
addressed through fair use analysis. The right of publicity would do well to
emulate this result.
VI. SUMMARY
When a new legal right is created, growth in response to changing
social needs is inevitable and even laudable. It is that growth which makes
law responsive and flexible. Under the courts' tutelage, however, a new
legal right must be carefully shaped so that its form does not flow beyond
its limited purpose and encroach adversely upon other areas of the law.
Thus far, court attention to the right of publicity has only broadened its
scope. Before its process of growth continues-and makes protecting any
rights of publicity absurd-the courts would do well to limit the scope of
the right of publicity and temper it in a direction more amenable to the
First Amendment. Rather than invent an entirely new and different scheme
for the purpose of this limitation, the existing copyright law doctrines of
idea/expression and fair use can be easily adapted for use in the right of
but will allow the commercial aspects to silently influence their analyses of the fair use
elements.
157 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd,
114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
158 White, 989 F.2d at 1519 (Kozinski, I., dissenting).
159 Id.
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publicity analysis. Given the Court's Acuff-Rose ruling, greater protection
of parody is now possible, allowing copyright law to intermesh better with
the First Amendment. Proponents of the right of publicity would do well to
emulate such a result, lest the argument for the right of publicity's
abolition gain strength and popularity.
Bestowing any sort of property right is not without cost, and the right
of publicity is no exception. Inevitably, there must be some encroachment
on the First Amendment, but this encroachment can be made mild in effect.
Under the above proposal, the right of publicity would no longer diminish
so severely First Amendment rights of free expression.
